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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate interaction between two rms, which are engaged in a
repeated procurement relationship modelled as a multiple criteria auction, and an auc-
tioneer (a government employee) who has discretion in devising the selection criteria.
A rst result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric informa-
tion (private cost) procurement auction into a symmetric information auction (in bribes)
for a common value prize. In a repeated setting we show that favoritism substantially
facilitates collusion. It increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic
implementation problems for a cartel of bidders that operates in a stochastically changing
environment. A most simple allocation rule where rms take turn in winning indepen-
dently of stochastic government preferences and rmscosts achieves full cartel e¢ ciency
including price, production and design e¢ ciency. In each period the selection criteria is
ne-tailored to the in-turn winner: the "environmentadapts to the cartel. This result
holds true when the expected punishment is a xed cost. When the cost varies with the
magnitude of the distortion of the selection criteria (compared with the true governments
preferences), favoritism only partially shades the cartel from the environment. We thus
nd that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at a high cost for society. Our analy-
sis suggests some anti-corruption measures that can be e¤ective to curb favoritism and
collusion in public markets. It also shows that the rotation of o¢ cials is not one of them.
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1 Introduction
Many cartels operate in a stochastically changing environment. In particular, this is the case
of rms involved in public procurement. The public demand for e.g., construction works
typically depends on a number of factors that are di¢ cult to predict. They include social
needs, elected representativespolitical agenda, internal budget concerns etc... In addition,
rmstechnology changes with time. Altogether this implies a signicant uncertainty about
the protability of future contracts. In face of such an uncertain environment, a cartel of
rms must devise a mechanism that while being responsive to changes does not open up for
gaming opportunities. In this paper we claim that favoritism can contribute to solving key
problems for a cartel of bidders that operate in a stochastically changing environment. A
main motivation for the paper is the mounting body of evidence that collusion and corruption
often go hand in hand in public procurement.
In France, practitioners and investigators in courts of accounts, competition authorities,
and in the judiciary have long been aware of the close links between collusion and corruption
in public procurement.1 According to one of the leading Parisian anti-corruption judges,
there exists in France, almost not a single case of large stake collusion in public procurement
without corruption.2 Beside empirical motivations, there are theoretical motivations for
investigating the links between favoritism and collusion. In particular, a cartel typically faces
a tension between the e¢ ciency goal and the need to provide rms with incentives to reveal
private information. A fair amount of attention has been given to the theoretical problems
facing a cartel that operates within an imperfectly or privately observable environment. The
general results of most relevance to our issue are due to Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1994). But their central e¢ ciency result has not always been applicable when approaching
more concrete issues. Recently, Athey and al. (2004) show that it can simply be too costly
1The testimony of J. C. Mery provides suggestive evidence of those links (Le Monde, September 22 and
23, 2000). J. C. Mery, a City Hall o¢ cial, admitted that for ten years (1985-94) he organized and arbitrated
collusion in the allocation of most construction and maintenance contracts for the Paris City Hall. In exchange,
rms were paying bribes used to nance political parties.
A recent judgment in Les Yvelines(Cour dAppel de Versaille, January 2002) provides a vivid illustration
as well.
2This judge from the Pole Financier was among other things involved in the investigation of corruption
allegations in the procurement of a 4.3 billion euros market for the recontruction of Pariss lycees (see Le
Monde April 23 2005). The case resulted in a series of convictions.
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for a price cartel to provide the right incentives for rms to reveal private information about
shocks to costs so the optimal mechanism entails price rigidity.3 Our analysis is concerned
with a cartel of bidders that face both incomplete information about demand i.e., government
preferences and asymmetric information about shocks to rmscosts. Most closely related to
our paper is Athey and Bagwell (2001). They study a price cartel that operates on a market
with a given demand but under asymmetric information about costs. They show that cartel
e¢ ciency (including production and price e¢ ciency) is achievable in a scheme where rms are
rewarded for truthfully reporting high costs by future market shares. Their e¢ ciency result
relies on assumptions that secure the existence (with su¢ ciently high probability) of states
where rms have an identical cost structure.4 In those states utility can be transferred at no
cost for the cartel. As a consequence future market shares can be used to provide incentives
for revealing private information without relinquishing production or price e¢ ciency. Our
main contribution is to show that, in an auction context, corruption can solve the cartels
information revelation problem in a situation characterized both by asymmetric information
and stochastic government demand. Full cartel e¢ ciency including, production, price and
design e¢ ciency (the contract is ne-tailored to the cartel) is achievable in a very simple
scheme relying on a non-contingent allocation rule so that rms take turn to win in a pre-
determined manner. Favoritism e¤ectively shades the cartel from hazards in the environment.
The expected cost of corruption determines the extent of favoritism. This result is established
for the case the expected punishment cost is independent of the magnitude of the distortion
of government preferences. When the expected punishment varies with that magnitude,
favoritism only partially shades the cartel from hazards in the environment. We nd that
favoritism generally exacerbates the social costs of collusion: the selected specication is
socially ine¢ ciency and the price paid by the government is higher than in the absence of
favoritism.
We model the procurement procedure as a rst score auction. Two rms characterized
by a vector of cost parameters compete in scores with o¤ers that include a specication of
the project and a price. Public preferences are stochastic. The procedure is administered by
an auctioneer who is a government employee. At the beginning of the period the auctioneer,
privately observes a signal of public preferences. His duty is to devise and announce a scoring
3See also Green and Porter (1984) for the analysis of a price cartel on a market with a demand subject to
shocks.
4Even then cartel e¢ ciency is only achievable under some conguration of the parameters.
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rule that reects the (current) public preferences. In the absence of favoritism, the procedure
selects the socially e¢ cient specication of the project.
The presence of asymmetric information between the government and its auctioneer im-
plies that the auctioneer has some discretion when deciding over the scoring rule. We call
favoritism the act of biasing the scoring rule in favor of one of the rms. Corruption is mod-
elled as an auction-like procedure that takes place before the o¢ cial auction. Firms compete
in (menus of) corrupt deals including a bribe and a demanded scoring rule. We nd that
with favoritism the procedure selects a non-standard specication of the project. The in-
tuition is that the associated scoring rule induces minimal competition and thus maximal
prot-if-win in the o¢ cial auction. In the one-shot setting favoritism turns the asymmet-
ric information private cost procurement auction, into a symmetric information auction (in
bribes) for a common value prize corresponding to inuence over the design of the contract.
A main intuition here is that corruption works as a revelation mechanism: rms truthfully
reveal their private information to the corrupt agent who uses that information to maximize
their rents because that maximizes the bribe he receives.
We then consider a situation where rms meet repeatedly, each period on a new market
(the auctioneers are short-run players). We show that favoritism fully solves the cartels prob-
lems related to stochastic government preferences and privately observable costs. Provided
each rm is e¢ cient at producing some specication of the project, the cartel can earn the
maximal income in a scheme that selects the winner independently of the true preferences and
of rmscosts. The intuition is that a corrupt auctioneer has own incentives to ne-tailor the
scoring rule to the in-turn winner. Firmsmain concern is to contain competition in bribes.
That is achieved by opting for a xed in-turn allocation rule which makes any defection from
the equilibrium strategies immediately observable.
In an extension we investigate a case where the expected punishment for favoritism is a
function of the magnitude of the distortion between the announced scoring rule and the true
preferences. We nd that the central insights from the xed punishment case carry over. In
the stage game competition in bribes does not dissipate all the rmsrents however. And in
the repeated setting the cartel may face a problem due to imperfect public information. For
high cost of punishment, the optimal scheme is contingent on the true government preferences
which are never observed. The o¢ cial auction outcome is bounded away from full cartel
e¢ ciency. For low cost of punishment the pre-determined in-turn allocation rule is optimal
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and full cartel e¢ ciency obtains.
The equilibrium allocation patterns emerging from the analysis is consistent with em-
pirical ndings. There exists ample evidence e.g., in developing countries of problems of
maintenance of construction objects due to the non-standard design that was selected in the
international procurement procedure (see Rose-Ackerman 1999). Evidence from corruption
scandals in France also show that the tender winner is the most e¢ cient rm and that its
prots often are larger than the average in the branch (30% contra 5%) as in the case with
the court case concerned with the series of constructions contracts in Paris.
A central policy implication is that since collusion and corruption are linked they must
investigated conjointly. A second implication of our analysis is that increasing the severeness
of punishment can have a real impact on the extent of favoritism. On the other hand the
much advocated anti-corruption policy aiming at reducing the time in any particular o¢ ce
i.e., making procurement agents short-run players nds no support in our analysis.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on corruption in auction.5 The auctioneers
abuse of discretion to devise the selection rule has been studied in Che and Burget (2004)
in the context of a single auction. The present article is most closely related to Compte,
Lambert-Mogiliansky and Verdier (2005) and Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006). Both
articles are concerned with links between corruption and collusion. They address a cartels
enforcement problem in a one-shot setting and focus on the impact of the auctioneers abuse
of discretion to let rms readjust their bid. In Compte et al. the auctioneer sells an illegal
opportunity to resubmit, which is shown to permit sustaining collusion in a single object
auction. In Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin, the auctioneer abuses a legal right to let all
rms simultaneously readjust their o¤er in the context of a multiple-object auction. As a
consequence collusive market-sharing becomes sustainable. The contribution of the present
paper is to demonstrate corruptions role with respect to another central problem of a cartel:
how to achieve (cartel) e¢ ciency in a stochastically changing environment.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. Section 3 o¤ers an
analysis of the one-stage game. In Section 4 we derive our central results. Section 5 proposes
an extension to the case with varying punishment cost. Central assumptions are discussed in
section 6 where we also suggest policy implications for procurement and control agencies.
5See for instance La¤ont J-J. and J. Tirole (1991), Celentani, M. and J. Ganunza, (2002), Che and Burget
(2004), Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky and Verdier (2005).
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2 The model
In each time period a project is allocated. A project allows for a multiplicity of specica-
tions. A specication is a vector q =(q1; :::qk) where qj represents the level of the j (quality)
component. There are two rms indexed i; i = 1; 2; which are characterized by their cost
function
ci
 
q;ti

=
kX
j=1
tijq
2
j
2
where tij 2

; 
	
; j = 1; :::; k is rm i0s cost parameter associated with quality component
qj in period t. The vector of cost parameters ti =
 
ti1; ::::::
t
ik

is rm is private information.
In each period there is a new draw of (1;2) : For the sake of convenience we remove the
realizations ti = (; ; :::; ); i = 1; 2 from the support and we assume that each rm has a
comparative advantage in at least one component.6 The probability of the realizations left
are proportional to the probabilities which we would have if parameters tij are i.i.d. with
prob(tij = ) =  across all i; j and t:
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The government derives utility from the realization of a project in period t:
W
 
qt; pt;t

= t1q
t
1 + :::+ 
t
kq
t
k   pt; (1)
with tj  0; 8j = 1:::k;
kX
j=1
tj = 1; (2)
where pt is the price paid to the rm that delivers the project and t =
 
t1; :::; 
t
k

is a
vector of parameters representing the true social preference in period t. A zero value for a
component j; tj = 0 is understood as no social value of qj above a minimal level that denes
a basic good. The vector t is random with full support k 1: The government does not
know the true t: It hires an auctioneer who privately observes a signal of the true t at the
beginning of each period. For simplicity we assume that the signal is fully informative.8
The auction rule
At the beginning of each period the auctioneer announces a selection criteria which is a
function of both price p and quality q = (q1; :::; qk) :We consider a class of selection criteria
6These restrictions basically imply that we disregard some special cases and focus on the main results.
Where that is relevant we comment on some implications of relaxing the restrictions.
7The precise characterization of the probability is rather complex but its details play no role for our results.
8This is a not an assumption crucial to our results.
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similar to the governments utility function:
S (q; b) = s (q; b)  p = kX
j=1
bjqj   p; kX
j=1
bj = 1;
where b is the vector of parameters announced by the auctioneer (see Timing below).
Throughout the paper we refer to b as the scoring rule which is a slight abuse of lan-
guage since the score of an o¤er is determined by its price also according to the selection
criterion. The rms simultaneously submit in a sealed envelop an o¤er including a project
specication qti and a price pi; i = 1; 2: The contract is awarded to rm i
t whose o¤er maxi-
mizes (among submitted o¤ers) the announced selection criteria subject to a reserve score
normalized to zero:
it 2 argmax
i=1;2
S
 
qti; p
t
i; b (3)
s:t : S
 
qti; p
t
i; b  0:
The winner is due to deliver the specication qti at price p
t
i. In case of tie in scores the
project is awarded to the rm whose quality score( i.e., s (q; b)) is highest. In case of tie
in both price and quality the auctioneer randomizes. We refer to this procedure as a First
Score Auction (FSA).
The rm is per-period prot-if-win is
ti = p
t
i   ci
 
qti;
t
i

: (4)
Prot-if-lose is zero. We assume that when a rm is indi¤erent between winning with zero
prot and losing, it chooses (so as) to win. The game is innitely repeated with the same two
rms but with a di¤erent auctioneer in each period. The rms discount future gains with a
common factor . Their payo¤ for the whole game is the discounted sum of the per period
payo¤s.
Corruption
The auctioneer is opportunistic. He accepts bribes in exchange for announcing a scoring
rule i.e., some b. The auctioneers utility is
U = w + b m;
where w is a wage that we normalize to 0; b is a bribe and m  0 is a term that captures
the expected punishment cost including moral and other costs associated with distorting
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government preferences:9 In the basic model expected punishment is a xed cost. This is
consistent with e.g., the French legislation (Code Penal 432-14, 432-11).10 In an extension we
consider the special case the expected punishment depends on the magnitude of the distortion
of social preferences and where k = 2; so U = b m (b1   1)2. Such a model can be relevant
when the magnitude of the distortion signicantly a¤ects the probability of detection. We
discuss these assumptions in section 6.
Corruption is modelled as a procedure whereby the rms compete in corrupt deals
where a deal is an o¤er to pay a bribe in exchange for a specic scoring rule. The two rms
simultaneously and secretly submit a menu of deals Mi = f(il; bil); l = 1; :::; nig, where ni
is (nite and) freely chosen by rm i:
The bribe is only paid by the o¢ cial auctions winner if the announced scoring rule cor-
responds to one he demanded. The assumption here is that the agent has some discretion to
intervene after the submission of the o¢ cial o¤ers. He may invalidate some bids appealing to
a formal default, or ask for a resubmission appealing to default in the tendering documents.11
As a result the auction procedure does not result in any allocation under the current period.
Although this might in practice occur before the o¢ cial opening, for simplicity we refer to
this action as "rejecting the auctions outcome". The key feature is that the agent can take
an action that results in zero payo¤s for all. This makes the payment of bribes enforceable
which is accounted for as an assumption. Another important consequence is that it also
prevents free-riding in corruption which we will show in the analysis.
3 The stage game
The stage game is dened by the following Timing :
step 0: Firms privately learn their cost parameters 1 and 2;
step 1 : The auctioneer learns; the rms submit each its menu of dealsM1 = f(b1l;1l) ; l = 1; :::; n1g
and M2 = f(b2l;2l) ; l = 1; :::; n2g) respectively;
step 2 : The auctioneer makes an announcement b; b 2 k 1;
step 3 : The rms simultaneously submit their o¤er (qi; pi) ; i = 1; 2;
9The government can engage a procedure to nd out its true preferences and punish the auctioneer if he
distorted them in his announcement.
10The punishment for favoritism is independent of the social-economic loss it induced.
11As argued in Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006) empirical evidence shows that there is ample oppor-
tunities for the auctioneer to intervene in the procedure so as to e¤ectively relaunch it and delay its outcome.
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step 4 : The auctioneer publicly opens the envelops and he selects the rm whose o¤er
maximizes the selection criteria corresponding to the announced scoring rule;
step 5: The auctioneer decides to conrm or reject the outcome of the auction. If he
conrms the outcome, the winner i pays a bribe b if and only if (b; b) 2Mi: Otherwise no
bribe is paid. If he rejects the outcome no transaction takes place.
We rst establish a result applying to the First Score Auction described by the Timing
above when deleting step 1 from consideration and as we show later applying to any subgame
starting from step 2. Throughout the paper we consider equilibria which are subgame perfect.
Lemma 1 The subgame perfect equilibrium o¤ers of the FSA are characterized by specica-
tion e¢ ciency: qi = argmax s (q; b)  c (q;i).
All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
The result exploits separability between quality and price in the selection criteria. It can
be shown that for any o¤er not including the e¢ cient values for the components, we can nd
another o¤er with the same score but that yields a higher expected prot.
The result in Lemma 1 greatly simplies the forthcoming analysis. Lemma 1 allows us
to, at step 3, separate between rmso¤er of project specication and their price bid.12 The
equilibrium values of the components are the e¢ cient ones corresponding to the announce-
ment
qi = argmax s (q;b)  c (q;i)
qij
 
ij ;cj = cjij ; i = 1; 2; j = 1:::; k:
When the announcement corresponds to the true government preferences, Lemma 1 implies
social e¢ ciency in the specication of the project.
3.1 Favoritism
We now proceed to investigate the one-shot game described in Timing above.
Proposition 1 There exists a Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium such that
12A similar result can be found in Che (1993).
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i. For m  ( )
2
the equilibrium scoring rule is b = (0; :::; 1j ; :::0) for some j ; 1j 6=
2j and b1j = b

2j =
( )
2
for all j: When m > (
 )
2
there is no favoritism.
ii. The equilibrium o¤ers are the competitive o¤ers relative to the announced scoring rule.
A rst result is that whatever the true government preferences, favoritism always entails
an extreme (single-peaked) scoring rule b = bj = (0; :::; 1j ; :::0) for some j:13 The intuition
for the single-peakness result is that the winners prot is maximal when the scoring rule
emphasizes a single component for which he has a comparative advantage. Alternatively, a
selection rule including a single-peaked scoring rule induces the "weakest possible competitive
pressure" among all FSA generated by any selection rule from the relevant class.
The interpretation of this result is that with favoritism the scoring rule tends to drive
to a minimum the weight given to most components while emphasizing quite exclusively a
component characterized by weak competition in production.14 This means that the winning
project has a specication that tends to be non-standardin the sense of being unusual. We
note that the true government preferences have minimal impact on the announced scoring
rule. In case of ties in the corruption game, the auctioneer may choose the deal that is most
congruent with the true preferences.
Quite remarkably we nd that rmsasymmetric information is a minor concern in our
context. The intuition is that a corrupt auctioneer has incentives to use that information to
devise a scoring rule that maximizes the winning rms rents as it also maximizes his bribe.15
Therefore rms have an incentive to reveal their cost. Yet, the agents favor is costly and
there may exist incentives for rms to free-ride. Indeed with some probability the two rms
have low cost on the same component. Therefore there is an incentive to let the other rm
demand a scoring rule in exchange for a bribe and undercut its o¢ cial bid to win. Such
deviation deprives the auctioneer from the bribe. He has therefore incentives to prevent it
which he can do by credibly threatening to reject the auctions result. In the appendix we
13We show in section 5 below (Extensions) that this result is robust to other specication of the punishment
costs.
14Strictly speaking the interpretation of zero weight as a minimal level is equivalent to assuming that
rms are (more or less identical) in the production of a basic goodwhile they di¤er in the production of
specications of the project in excess of the requirement dening the basic good.
15An honest auctioneer uses information about costs to minimize rmsrents. If he knew the rmscosts,
he would simply give the contract to the most e¢ cient rm and pay it its actual cost i.e., he would leave no
rents to the winner.
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show that in equilibrium there is no free-riding so rms cost structure is fully revealed
to the auctioneer in the submitted menus of deals. The rms infer all relevant information
about each others cost structure from the announced scoring rule. The equilibrium o¤ers are
the (unique) competitive Nash equilibrium o¤ers of the symmetric information FSA dened
by the announced scoring rule (for details see the appendix). The o¤ered specications are
e¢ cient relative to b and the equilibrium price is determined by the second score.
Competition for favors drives up the bribe to b = ( )
2
( m) which is the prot that
yields with a scoring rule that is most favorable to the winner. Since this prot is the same
for the two rms, the auctioneer captures the totality of the winning rms rents.16 In the
remaining of the paper we assume that m < (
 )
2
so the stage game is characterized by
favoritism.17 Note that this feature i.e., that the equilibrium yields zero payo¤ to both rms
makes it a particularly good candidate for serving as a threat equilibrium in the repeated
game that we investigate next.
We see that, in e¤ect, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) auction,
into a symmetric information common value auction (in bribes) for a prize. The prize is
inuence over the design of the selection rule which has a common value corresponding to the
gain when winning the o¢ cial auction with a maximally favorable selection criteria. This gain
is common knowledge and identical for both rms.18 The social cost of favoritism is twofold.
First, a socially ine¢ cient project specication is selected. Second, the price paid by the
government is higher than in the absence of favoritism. The bias in project specication due
to favoritism minimizes competition between rms. The equilibrium depicted in Proposition
1 will serve a threat point in the collusive schemes we study next.
16We wish to remark that if rms have an identical cost structure, favoritism has no value. If one of the
rms is ine¢ cient on all components but not the other, we would have favoritism but no competition so the
bribe would just cover the punishment cost m.
17When reviewing court cases, it appears quite clear that the cost of favoritism is very low. The only
instances of conviction for favoritism in France pertain to cases where the auctioneer explicitly required a rm
specic technology. (Cour des Graces 2002 ).
18We consider a symmetric case but the logic would be the same if we allowed for some asymmetry in the
cost structure. All that a rm needs to know is the other rms value of winning the contract under the most
favorable circumstances i.e., with a selection rule that gives full weight to a component such that the rm has
the largest comparative advantage in its production.
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4 Collusion and Favoritism: A Strategic Complementarity
We now proceed to investigate a situation when the two rms interact repeatedly. In each
period they meet on a public market administered by a new auctioneer, e.g., di¤erent local
governments. In each period there is a new draw of
 
t1;
t
2;
t

:We are interested in collusion
between the two rms under the assumption that transfers between them are precluded.
Information assumptions: At the end of each period the submitted contract o¤ers are
publicly observed by the two rms and the active auctioneer. The corrupt deal o¤ers remain
private information to the involved parties. The true value of  is never revealed. Each auc-
tioneer is appointed for one period only and there is no communication between auctioneers
from di¤erent periods.
We consider a repetition of the game described in Timing (Section 3). Proposition 2
constitutes the central result of this paper.
Proposition 2 i. There exists 1 < 1 and m such that for   1 and m  m full cartel
e¢ ciency is achievable in a Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
ii. In the o¢ cial auction rms take turn in winning independently of government prefer-
ences and rmscosts.
iii. The equilibrium scoring rule is single-peaked (i.e., b = (0; :::; 1; :::0)) and the winning
rm i pays a bribe bi = m:
Full cartel e¢ ciency is dened for the o¢ cial auction as follows. i. In each period the
winner is (one of) the most e¢ cient rms relative to the announced selection criteria (produc-
tive e¢ ciency); ii. The price paid to the winner is the highest price the government is willing
to pay (price e¢ ciency); iii. The selection criteria that applies yields the highest gains to
the winning rm from among all possible selection criteria (design e¢ ciency). Note that the
third part of our criteria goes beyond the standard denition of cartel e¢ ciency. Proposition
2 establishes that with favoritism full cartel e¢ ciency is achievable in spite of incomplete and
asymmetric information.19,20 The cartel needs not adapt to the environment i.e., to the
current cost structure or to the current government preferences. Instead the environment
19Notice that the rm that wins rst has a higher expected discounted payo¤. We can equate the two rms
discounted payo¤s by randomly designing the rst winner.
20We here wish to remark that the results in proposition 2 hold true even when rms have an identical cost
structure (a case that we excluded in the model). However full cartel e¢ ciency can obviously not obtain if
one of the rm has high cost on all components (but the other has not).
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adapts to the cartel: in each period the auctioneer ne-tailors the scoring rule to the in-turn
winner. The optimal allocation rule is extremely simple: rms take turn for winning in a non-
contingent manner. A main concern for the cartel is to contain competition in bribes which
can be very costly as we learned from Proposition 1. Proposition 2 shows that competition
for favors is eliminated when opting for a non-contingent in-turn allocation rule. At the
corruption stage both rms o¤er a menu of deals each with a single-peaked scoring rule as
in Proposition 1. The out-of-turn rm o¤ers a zero bribe while the in-turn winner o¤er a
bribe that just covers the expected punishment cost m: The out-of-turn rm may deviate
and (unobserved) bribe the auctioneer to announce a scoring rule favorable to itself. This is
immediately detected however - the pre-determined in-turn rule is violated - and punished
by reverting to the equilibrium of proposition 1 which yields zero payo¤ to both rms from
next period on: This explains why the bribe can be kept to a minimum of m: In the o¢ cial
auction the out-of-turn rm submits an o¤er that scores at most zero. Since contract o¤ers
become public information any defection at that stage is detected after the o¢ cial opening
and punished similarly.
We thus see that favoritism facilitates collusion in several ways. The gains from collusion
are higher than with an honest auctioneer: the scoring rule is ne-tailored to maximize the
winners prot. While the threat payo¤s are lower than in the absence of corruption be-
cause competition in bribes dissipates the rents. Most importantly we nd that favoritism
solves key problems for a repeated cartel in a stochastic environment. The auctioneers self-
interested determination of the scoring rule e¤ectively shades the cartel from uctuations
in the protability of projects due to stochastic government preferences and changing costs.
The environment adaptsto the cartel and ex-post e¢ ciency i.e., e¢ ciency relative to the
announced scoring rule, is secured. But this comes at a cost, the bribe.
Finally we note that in the equilibrium of the one-shot game the agent is limited to
choosing a scoring rule that minimizes competition i.e., a scoring rule emphasizing a (single)
component such that rms have di¤erentiated technologies (costs). In the repeated setting
with collusion, the agent needs not bother about cost di¤erentials. So, in a sense, collusion
makes favoritism easier": the agents equilibrium choice set is larger.
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4.1 The impact of the expected punishment cost
In this section we discuss the impact of an increase in the expected cost of punishment
on players incentives, payo¤s and strategies. In the appendix we show that defection
from the equilibrium strategies supporting our result in Proposition 2 can be deterred i¤

(1 2)

1
2  m

 12 : Recalling that all our analysis is performed for m <
( )
2
= NE we
know that 12  m > 0 and so 1 < 1: A rst interesting point is that
@1
@m > 0 which means
that the larger the cost of punishment, the more patient rms must be to be able to sustain
collusion with favoritism. This suggests that anti-corruption policy may have a real impact
on competition in procurement. But as favoritism becomes more expensive (m grows), there
may exist equilibria without favoritism but with collusion that Pareto dominate the equilib-
rium of proposition 2. In order to investigate that issue we must spend some time on "pure
collusion".
Pure collusion in our context means that rms do not compete with each other but
there is no manipulation of the selection criteria which always reects the true government
preferences. We do not go into the details of the pure collusion case. Instead, we shall rely
heavily on Athey and Bagwell (2001) who provide a thorough analysis of similar case. We
only focus on a few features of relevance to our discussion.
Under pure collusion there is no manipulation of the selection criteria. As a consequence
the selection of the winner must be contingent on
 
t1;
t
2;
t

i.e., on rmscost parameters
and on current government preferences in order to secure the cartels production e¢ ciency
goal. Clearly, for any realization of
 
t1;
t
2;
t

, the gain from winning the contract is largest
for the rm whose cost structure is most congruent with current government preferences.
Assume rst that the agent is honest. Under symmetric information about costs First
Best can be achieved in a simple mechanism that designates the winner as the rm with the
cost structure most congruent with current government preferences. The designated winner
submits a bid that scores exactly 0 and the other rm a bid that scores less than zero. Any
deviation from those strategies is observable and triggers a reversal to a competitive Nash
equilibrium.21 Let EFBc denote rms expected First Best collusive payo¤. Appealing to
our result in Proposition 1(i) (that establishes the optimality of the single-peaked scoring
21We do not characterize the equilibrium of the stage game without favoritism. By lemma 1, we know
that the equilibrium specication is socialy e¢ cient. The rms compete in price given their beliefs about the
others cost structure.
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rule) we know that FBc < 12 where the left-hand-side is the pure collusion prot-if-win and
the right-hand-side of the inequality is the prot-if-win (gross of the bribe) under favoritism
(see Proposition 2).
Under asymmetric information things are much more tricky, production e¢ ciency re-
quires a mechanism that induces rms to truthfully reveal their private information. Athey
and Bagwell (2001) show that for some combination of parameters, the cartels rst-best is
achievable provided there exist states where utility can be transferred at no cost for the cartel.
A mechanism similar to theirs could be devised. A full characterization of such a mechanism
is beyond the scope of this section. We just note that a key feature of the mechanism is to
exploit states where rms are equally e¢ cient to secure incentives for truth-telling.22 In our
context such states do also exist i.e., when rms are equally e¢ cient relative to government
preferences:23 Just as in Athey and Bagwell, cartel e¢ ciency is demanding on parameters
so it is likely that the optimal pure collusion mechanism is plagued by some ine¢ ciency so
Ec < EFBc where Ec is the expected prot from pure collusion:24 But that is not crucial
to our argument.
We now return to the case with a corruptible agent. Suppose that m = mt so m changes
with time. Assume that in period t; 12  mt < Ec where Ec( EFBc) is the expected
payo¤ of pure collusion. Then both (the in-turn and the out-of-turn) rms would prefer to
refrain from bribery if they could collect the expected pure collusion payo¤. In the mechanism
of proposition 2 that would not happen however. A violation of the in-turn rule leads to
a reversal to the zero payo¤ Nash equilibrium of the stage game. But rms could make
their strategies contingent on m: Namely for mt  12   Ec; they play the equilibrium
of proposition 2 but for mt > 12   Ec they play an optimal pure collusion equilibrium.
Note importantly that the presence of a corruptible agent relaxes the (o¤-schedule) incentive
constraint compared to the case when the agent is honest.25 This is because the threat payo¤s
22 In our context truth-revelation could be achieved by conditioning rmss probability to be selected as the
winner on their cost announcement.
23Assume that government only values the two rst components and that rms have the same cost for those,
then they are equally e¢ cient.
24When truth revelation is not achievable costlessly, it may be achieved at some cost in productive e¢ ciency
or price e¢ ciency.
25This terminology is borrowed from Athey and Bagwell (2001). The o¤-schedule incentive constraint reects
rmsincentives to take observable defection steps. As opposed to the in-schedule incentive constraint that
are related to incentives to take actions designed for their type. Defection in that respect is not observable.
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are the ones corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of the one-stage game with favoritism
which yields zero payo¤s.
The discussion above shows that the cost of favoritism to society depends critically on
the expected cost of punishment m. For m < 12   Ec rms achieve the highest payo¤
in an equilibrium with favoritism. The social cost of favoritism includes a distortion of the
selection criteria. The winning project is not the social e¢ cient one and it is paid at the high
collusive price. In that equilibrium the higher the cost of punishment the more patient rms
need to be to be able to sustain collusion in equilibrium. For m  12   Ec the social cost
due to the presence of corruptible agent may be limited to facilitating collusion by making it
sustainable for lower level of the discount factor (because the "threat payo¤" is then zero).
There is no social cost due to design ine¢ ciency (but we may have production ine¢ ciency
i.e., when the First Best is not feasible) and the government pays a lower (collusive) price
than in the case of favoritism. Finally we note that further increase in m (up to (
 )
2
) has
no impact on playersincentives.
5 Extensions
In this section we extend the analysis by considering the case when the expected punishment
for favoritism depends on the magnitude of the distortion of social preferences. We do that
in a simpler setting with k = 2 so 1 =  and 2 = (1  ) and  is uniformly distributed on
[0; 1] : The auctioneers utility is U = b  m (b  )2 : Note that since, by assumption, each
rm has a comparative advantage in at least one component (see the model description), the
k = 2 case boils down to symmetric information.26
The time-line of events in the stage game is as follows:
step 0: Firms learn privately their cost parameters 1 and 2:
step 1 : The auctioneer learns ; the rms submit their corruption deals f(b1l; 1l)gand f(b2l; 2l) ; g ; l =
1; ::ni; I = 1; 2;
step 2 : The auctioneer makes an announcement b; b 2 [0; 1] ;
step 3 : The rms submit their contract o¤ers (qi; pi) ;
26We learned from proposition 1 that asymmetric information is not a big concern in our setting. Therefore,
the k = 2 provides a satisfying model to focus on the new features due to a variable expected punishment
cost.
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step 4 : The auctioneer publicly opens the envelops and he selects the rm whose o¤er
maximizes the selection criteria corresponding to the announced scoring rule;
step 5: The auctioneer decides to conrm or reject the outcome. If he conrms the
winner i pays a bribe b if and only if (b; b) 2Mi: Otherwise no bribe is paid. If he rejects
no transaction takes place.
Proposition 3 characterizes symmetric Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria of the stage game
described above. We show that for m  45

( )
2

Proposition 3 Any symmetric Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium is characterized by
i. The equilibrium scoring rule is b (m;) =
8<: 1 for   1=20 for  < 1=2 ;
ii. The equilibrium bribe o¤er is b1 = b2 = b (m) =
( )
2
 m;
iii. The contract o¤ers are the competitive equilibrium o¤ers relative to the announced
scoring rule.
A rst important result is that the equilibrium scoring rule is single-peaked as in the
xed punishment case. In the appendix we prove this as a lemma. The intuition is that in
the corruption game rms compete in the auctioneers utility levels. This utility is separable
in bribe and expected punishment cost. We show that for any deal with  =2 f0; 1g that
achieves a given utility to the auctioneer there exists a deal with  2 f0; 1g that achieves
the same utility level but yields a higher expected prot for the rms. We also note that, as
in Proposition 1, the o¢ cial auction o¤ers are the (e¢ cient) competitive equilibrium o¤ers
relative to the announced scoring rule.
In contrast with earlier results competition for favors does not dissipate all rmsrents.
The intuition is that contingent punishment costs introduces an asymmetry between rms:
the rm whose demanded scoring rule is closer to the true preferences has more bribing
power than the other rm. Firmsincomplete information about the true preferences therefore
induces a continuity of the probability to win in the submitted bribe. As a result competition
for favor is mitigated.
The results in proposition 3 apply for m  45

( )
2

: Since (
 )
2
is the competitive
prot-if-win associated with the most favorable scoring rule, this range covers most interesting
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cases.27 Over that range of value for m the prot-if-win is simply i = m:
Summing up, with an expected punishment cost that is a function of distortion, the scoring
rule always induces a "non-standard" project. What government expenditure concerns there
is no advantage in the more sophisticated punishment rule. Finally, because it mitigates
competition in favors, some of the rents stays with the rms. We conclude that in the stage
game, the sophisticated punishment scheme o¤ers no advantage from the point of view of
social e¢ ciency.
We now consider a repeated version of the game described above. As in the case with k-
components, the two rms meet in each period with a new (short-run) auctioneer. At the end
of each period, the submitted contracts o¤ers are publicly observed by the two rms and the
active auctioneer. The corrupt deal o¤ers remain private information to the involved parties.
The true value of  is never revealed. There is no communication between auctioneers from
di¤erent periods.
Proposition 4 i. For   22 (0; 1), there exists a Public Perfect Equilibrium equilibrium
of the repeated game with collusion in contract o¤ers and in corruption deals.
ii. Form small a simple pre-determined in-turn allocation rule is optimal while form large
any optimal collusive scheme entails a contingent allocation rule.
A rst important remark is that collusion in contract o¤ers and in bribes is achievable
in a simple pre-determined in-turn scheme at b = m. The reasoning is similar to that
in proposition 2. However, for m relatively large, the simple scheme implies a signicant
loss in revenue for the cartel. This is because in such a scheme the bribe always covers the
punishment cost associated with the maximal distortion of the scoring rule relative to the
true one. The bribe cost can be reduced in a contingent scheme but that may not always be
worthwhile because of imperfect public information which induces new ine¢ ciencies.
We rst note that once the winner has been designated, collusion in the o¢ cial auction is
sustainable relying on a standard folk theorem argument. This is because o¤ers become public
information with the o¢ cial opening of the envelops. As in earlier Propositions, in the scheme
27 In an earlier version we investigated the whole solution. For m > 4
5

D
2

the equilibrium bribe is equal
to the expected punishment cost and favoritism occurs less often. As the cost grows larger, it becomes fully
prohibitive.
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of Proposition 4, the announcement of the agent results from competition in corruption deals
and determines the winner (as the rm whose cost structure is most congruent with the
announced scoring rule). A main issue for the cartel is therefore to sustain collusion in
corrupt deals in order to contain competition in bribes and make an e¢ cient use of stochastic
government preferences as an allocation rule. The problem is that rms do not know the
true scoring rule and do not observe the submitted bribe deals. They only observe the
announced scoring rule which is an imperfect public signal of rmsaction in the corruption
game. Therefore rms must sometime be punishedeven when complying (this result is a
similar to results in Green and Porter (1986) and Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986)). In
the appendix we provide an example showing that collusion is sustainable in a Public Perfect
Equilibrium (PPE) with b = 14m: A PPE is a prole of public strategies that, beginning any
date t and given any public history till time t; forms a Nash equilibrium.28 Deterrence from
defection at the bribing stage is achieved by the threat of competition in the o¢ cial auction.
In case a rm wins twice in a row, it is punishedby the other rm which then submits an
o¤er that scores more than zero. This reduces the cartels revenue (we have price ine¢ ciency).
In our example, we have an equilibrium with a contingent scheme that is bounded away from
full cartel e¢ ciency but that dominates the xed in-turn rule scheme for m not too small.
We did not aim at characterizing an optimal contingent mechanism but it can be shown
that any contingent mechanism is bounded away from full cartel e¢ ciency. This may seem
to conict with the results in Fundenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994). A main reason is that
our model does not satisfy their property of pairwise identiability. But most importantly
e¢ ciency fails because the cartel only has a limited set of instruments to achieve conicting
goals. When applying the general theory to real interaction situations Athey and Bagwell
(2001) hit upon that problem. In their model e¢ ciency is achievable but only under some
conguration of the parameters (and with direct communication between rms). The sit-
uation is similar here with a tension between information revelation, design e¢ ciency and
production or price e¢ ciency. In the present context with only two components and with
government preferences uniformly distributed over [0; 1] ; there is no state where rms are
identically e¢ cient (and thus utility cannot be transferred at no cost for the cartel). As a
consequence to achieve information revelation (or collusion in bribes) one must relinquish
28A strategy for player i is public if, at each time t; the strategy depends only on the public history and not
on i0s private history.
19
price e¢ ciency (see appendix). In an earlier version we considered a case where there existed
states where rms were identical. Even then full cartel e¢ ciency including, price, production
and design e¢ ciency could not obtained because we have a trade-o¤ between design e¢ ciency
and bribe minimization.
The main insight from Proposition 4 is that even with a variable expected punishment cost
favoritism facilitates collusion. First, for m not too large, favoritism increases the collusive
gain and it always reduces the threat payo¤s. Second, for m not too large the simple xed
in-turn rule is optimal. For larger m and unlike in the case with a xed punishment cost,
favoritism here does not fully shade rms from future hazards in preferences and costs. Yet,
matters are simplied for rms. With favoritism the prot-if-win is fully known by force of
single-peakness and depends minimally on the environment. As a result favoritism allows for
a reasonably simple contingent collusive scheme to sustain collusion.
Our conclusion is that the central insight from proposition 2 i.e., that favoritism facilitates
collusion in face of demand uncertainty (incomplete information about the true government
preferences) and privately observed shocks to costs, partly carries over to the case when the
punishment cost that varies with the magnitude of the distortion. Favoritism relaxes the
incentive constraints by increasing the collusive gain and decreasing the threat payo¤. With
a variable punishment cost, favoritism may not always bring about larger gains in terms of a
simplied scheme compared with no corruption collusion.
6 Discussion
The main insights of the analysis can be summarized as follows:
 Favoritism facilitates collusion because
 It induces the revelation of rmsprivate information as that information is used
by the corrupt auctioneer to maximize the winners rent;
 It shades rms from uctuations in government preferences. The selected contract
specication reects the cartels interests instead of social preferences;
 Favoritism exacerbates the cost of collusion for society. The contract specication is
socially ine¢ cient and the price is higher than with collusion alone.
 Anti-corruption policy can have a real impact on rmsbehavior.
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The analysis thus reveals that favoritism fundamentally perverts the auction mechanism
both what concerns the use of rmsprivate information (about their costs) and that of the
agents private information about government preferences.
A central intermediary result is that the equilibrium scoring rule is extreme i.e., "single-
peaked". In the one-shot setting this allows to minimize competition between rms. As
a result the selected project tends to be non-standard in the sense that the winning rm
is alone to be e¢ cient at its production. In the repeated setting competition is less of an
issue because of collusion. As a result the winning rms rents can be maximize for a larger
range of project specications each of which responding to a single-peaked scoring rule. Most
procurement codes include provisions that preclude the use of non-standard (a fortiori rm
specic) specications and that encourage generic technical specication. Interestingly, even
for the simplest objects such as print paper one may not be able to dene a unique standard
(see Compte and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2000)). When dealing with complex procurement
projects, it is simply not realistic to expect being able to dene a unique generic specication.
Choices have to be made either by settling for a technical solution or in a scoring rule.
Often it is mistakenly believed that a rst price auction of a technically specied object
precludes favoritism. In Compte and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2000), it is demonstrated that
such procedure can be even more vulnerable to favoritism. A technical specication can
bias competition at a larger cost for the government than a scoring rule. Generally, the
use of a scoring rule (that weights technical components or performance measures) increases
competition and thereby reduces the stake of favoritism. Our analysis applies within the
spectrum of discretion consistent with typical anti-favoritism provisions. It says that within
that spectrum, favoritism results in the selection of a project specication that maximizes
the winners rent. It also says that collusion relaxes a constraint on equilibrium scoring rule
(i.e., it needs not minimize competition), which presumably makes favoritism more di¢ cult
to detect.
Single-peakness as the solution to rent maximization, obtains from the conjunction of a
series of assumptions most of them are standard or reasonable. Two assumptions deserve
some comments: separability in costs between components and separability in bribes and
punishment cost. There is a natural way to reinterpret the single-peakness result when relax-
ing the assumption of separability in costs. If we have complementarities in costs, one should
group components that are complementary in production into a composite component that
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is given full weight in a proper manner. Clearly, a more involved cost structure would entail
more complex computation of the demanded scoring rule(s) and a more involved operation
to compute the scoring rule that maximizes the winners rent (used in the stage game). A
conjecture is that the menu of deal o¤ers is su¢ ciently rich a message language to allow for
quite sophisticated information to be revealed so the auctioneer can minimize competition
as in the basic model. With (ex-ante) symmetric rms the prize i.e., winning the contract
with minimal competition is the same for both rms in which case most of the results carry
over. Some additional analysis may be required if we want to relax the assumption about
separability in bribes and expected punishment. In particular to investigate the case when
the auctioneer is not willing to take a bribe so high that it covers the expected cost of all
distortions. However, evidence suggests (see footnote 8 and policy implications below) that
the expected cost is rather low in which case the problems related to bribe cap would not
arise.
Our conjecture is thus that the main insights of the analysis do not depends on the ne
details of the model but capture central features of the reality of favoritism in procurement
as revealed by empirical evidence. First there exists numerous anecdotal evidence e.g., from
developing countries. In one case an Africa country set its telephone specication to require
equipment that could survive in frigid climate. Only one telephone company from Scandinavia
could satisfy this obviously worthless specication (Rose-Ackerman (1999), p.64). Similarly
problems of maintenance of construction objects are often due to the non-standard project
specication that was selected by the international procurement procedure. Second, the
allocation pattern emerging from the analysis: a pre-determined in-turn rule that allocates
the contract to the most e¢ cient rm while generating large prots is very close to the
patterns observed in Paris Hall case mentioned in the Introduction. Interestingly, people
have argued that the fact that the contract were allocated to the most e¢ cient rm was an
indication that there was no collusion. The present analysis shows that it is su¢ cient that
each rm has a comparative advantage in some component for this outcome to obtain in a
collusive equilibrium with favoritism.
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7 Policy implications
A central message of the analysis is that the risks of collusion and favoritism are linked and
must be addressed simultaneously. Yet, the investigation of collusion is often the jurisdiction
of Competition Authorities while that of corruption is the jurisdiction of criminal courts. A
rst recommendation is to develop cooperation to overcome this institutional separation so
as to improve e¢ ciency in the prosecution of cases that involve both favoritism (corruption)
and collusion.
The analysis conrms earlier results (see e.g., La¤ont and Tirole (1993) and Che and
Burget (2004)) that discretion to devise the scoring rule is subject to capture by rms. This
seems to suggest that one should eliminate the agents discretion i.e., let the agent administer
a rst price auction. But that would be highly naive a conclusion. Indeed scoring rules are
used to give exibility in design which generally increases competitive pressure. In a pure rst
price auction the object has to be fully dened by the technical specications. Compte and
Lambert-Mogiliansky (2000) show that the decisions related to the technical specication
is even more sensitive to capture than those related to the scoring rule because they are
linked with higher rents. On the other hand if a rst price auction is associated with a
standardization of the technical specication, the agents discretion can be truly reduced.
Our result gives support to a policy that reduces the agents discretion to devise the scoring
rule but only when the technical specication can be standardized. When standardization is
too costly (or not feasible), the auctioneers decision should be subjected to close scrutiny.
This recommendation is in line with Steven Kelman (1994)29 who argues in favor of exibility
in association with increased accountability of procurement o¢ cials. Concretely this means
for instance an obligation to motivate their decisions in writing. Another type of measures
recognizes that rms often have a superior information about each other than the government
has. They can be in a position to recognize when a scoring rule is ne-tailored to some other
rm. A recommendation would be to consider devising a mechanism to reveal this information
e.g., by performing an anonymous consultation prior the o¢ cial submission.
Our results suggest that there is a real role to play for anti-corruption policy (con-
trols and punishments) to play. From proposition 2 we know that the minimal discount
factor1 increases with m from 1 (m = 0)  :62: An anti-corruption policy aiming at induc-
29Harvard professor Steven Kelman was the director of the O¢ ce of Federal Procuremnt Policy under
1993-1997.
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ing a positive m has the immediate e¤ect of precluding the most impatient rms. As we
noted in section 4.1, further increasing in m over some threshold may even induce rms to
refrain from favoritism altogether so the cost to society is then limited to a high collusive
price. The risk of favoritism disappears when the expected punishment cost is so high that
it exceeds the stage game competitive payo¤.
The potential e¢ ciency of the repressive tools contrasts with the current legislation in the
European Union that makes it very di¢ cult to convict for favoritism. A central reason for this
is that favoritism is di¢ cult to prove. Indeed, generally any selection criteria would favor some
rm(s) at the expense of others. "Deciding to build a swimming pool rather than a stadium is
good for rms that have a comparative advantage in building swimming pools." The problem
is thus to compare between selection criteria that favor di¤erent rms. The honest auctioneer
picks up the one that is congruent with public preferences while the corrupt selects another
one. But public preferences are seldom so well-dened that congruence can be measured in a
way that is non-controversial (which also suggests that a xed punishment cost model maybe
the relevant one). Generally, detecting and proving the occurrence of favoritism is di¢ cult.
An implication of the analysis is that attention should be paid to a careful study of allocation
patterns over time. Unfortunately courts tend to focus on bribery and few cases of favoritism
are brought to court. We thus suggest that sophisticated economic expertise be given more
power in cases where there is a suspicion of favoritism. Indeed, while this is the rule in cases
of standard collusion, economist expertise appears to be seldom requested in cases involving
corruption and favoritism.
Finally, in our analysis we have assumed that the agents were short-run players. The
idea is that the rms are rather specialized and meet on public markets that are set up in
di¤erent jurisdictions and therefore administrated by di¤erent agents. The demand for e.g.,
public sport facilities is not recurrent in any single jurisdiction. But we could also interpret
our results in the context of rms who meets on public markets organized by the same
administration but with o¢ cials who are often moved from one position to another. Such
a policy is often advocated to prevent corruption which is presumed to be easier to sustain
within the frame of long-running relationships. Our result shows that this presumption is not
warranted here. On the contrary the short-run character of the agents permits rms to earn
all the rents from collusion. So our results suggest that a high turnover of o¢ cials certainly
does not make favoritism more di¢ cult.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
For any announcement b; the e¢ cient specication for rm i is dened: qi = argmax s (q; b) 
ci (q;i). We claim that in the equilibrium of the FSA both rms o¤er the e¢ cient speci-
cation corresponding to their cost structure. Assume that this was not the case i.e., that, in
equilibrium, rm i o¤ers (bq;bp) with bq 6= qi : We rst note that under asymmetric informa-
tion prob fwinj ((bq;bp))g > 0. To show this we order the rmstype according to the number
of components for which they have high cost (so each such type corresponds to a group of
"elementary types") 
0
<; :::; < 
k 1
; where 
k 1
is the highest cost type (recall the fully inef-
cient types have been deleted from the distribution). Let S () = maxq s (q; b) ci (q;) ; in
our model we have that prob
n
winjS


k 1o
> 0: If the o¤er (q;p) for some 
j
< 
k 1
was
such that prob fwinj (q;p)g < prob
n
winjS


k 1o
; it could not be an equilibrium o¤er
since the score in decreasing in cost i.e., there would exist another o¤er that would yield
higher expected prot.
We now show that o¤er (qi ;p
0) with p0 = bp + s (qi ; b)   s (bq; b) dominates (bq;bp) : Note
that S (qi ;p
0) = S (bq;bp) so in particular prob fwinj (bq;bp)g = prob fwinj (qi ;p0)g : Now the
expected prot from submitting (qi ;p
0) is
i
 
qi ;p
0;i

=

p0   ci (qi ;i)

prob

winj  qi ;p0	
= [bp  ci (bq;i) + s (q; b)  ci (qi ;i)  (s (bq; b)  ci (bq;i))] prob fwinj (bq;bp)g
> [bp  ci (bq;i)] prob fwinj (bq;bp)g = i (bq;bp;i)g:
The last inequality holds because s (q; b)  ci (qi ;i) > s (bq; b)  ci (bq;i) :
The argument applying to the symmetric information case which we also use below is
even simpler. Consider the case when rm 1 has a cost structure that is more congruent
with the announced scoring rule than rm 2. Firm 1 is sure to win when submitting the
second highest score (corresponding to rm 2s e¢ cient specication associated with a price
bid equal to its cost) because the tie breaking rule favors quality. Suppose rm 2 submits an
o¤er that does not include the e¢ cient specication and rm 1 matches that score. Then rm
2 could switch to an o¤er that includes the e¢ cient specication to achieve a higher score
and win. Suppose now that rm 1 matches rm 2s score with an o¤er that does not include
the e¢ cient specication. Appealing to the argument above (setting the winning probability
equal to 1), we see that it cannot be optimal. Firm 1 could earn a higher prot with an
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o¤er that scores the same but includes the e¢ cient specication. Similar reasoning applies
when rms are identically e¢ cient. Hence, in equilibrium rms submit o¤ers that include
the e¢ cient specication. QED
B Proof of proposition 1
We consider the following strategies for the players:
Firms:
At step 1 submit a menu of deal o¤er
 
j ; b
	
with a deal for each component j; ji =
 with a single-peaked scoring rule i.e., j = (0; :::; 1j ; :::; 0). The same bribe is o¤ered in
each one of the deals belonging to the o¤ered menu. Both rms o¤er b = ( )
2
:
At step 3, when the announced scoring rule is single-peaked, rms submit the competitive
equilibrium o¤ers under the assumption that they are anti-symmetric in cost (for b = j if
ji =  then j i = ). When the scoring rule is not single-peaked, the (non-deviating) rm
believes the other has a cost structure fully congruent with the announced scoring rule (i.e.,
that the rm has low cost on all emphasized components) and submits the corresponding
competitive o¤er.
The auctioneer:
At step 2, the auctioneer selects from among the submitted corrupt deals a deal that
includes the highest bribe provided the bribe covers the cost m. From among the highest
bribe deals he selects a one associated with a scoring rule only demanded by one rm if there
is any. If there are none, he randomizes among the highest bribe deals. If there are several
deals demanded by one rm only he randomizes among those. He announces the associated
scoring rule.
At step 5, the auctioneer maintains the outcome of the auction if the winner is one who
demanded the favor (and by assumption will pay for it) or if no favors were demanded.
Otherwise he rejects the outcome.
Note that the playerss action at Step 4 are not specied. This is because they are fully
determined by the rules and assumptions of the game.
We below show that the strategies described above form a Perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the game.
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For that purpose it is useful to rst derive the competitive o¤ers that form the Nash
equilibrium of the First Score Auction described by step 3 and 4 with no bribes with the
following out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The non-deviating rm (2) plays competitively as if the
other rm has the cost structure which is most congruent with the announced scoring rule
i.e., low cost on all emphasized components). The deviating rm (1) plays as if the other rm
had the least congruent cost structure i.e., high cost on all emphasized components. Although
these beliefs are not consistent they generate the largest possible gain from deviation with
respect to the demanded scoring rule at the corruption deal submission stage. Those beliefs
are designed so as to make the deviation most attractive.
We know from lemma 1 that rms choose qi = argmaxq s (q; b)   c (q;i) : Suppose b
emphasizes n component n < k; rm 1 expects rm 2 to make an o¤er including q2 = qij (i)
so its quality score is
P
j j

j


=
P
j
2j

; for j = 1; :::n: By a standard argument, rm 2
bids the lowest price that just secures non-negative prot
p2 = c (q

2;2) =
nX
j
cj2
2
: (5)
Firm 1s best response is to bid the highest price that secures win:
p1 = c (q

2; 2) + s (q

1)  s (q2) = p2 +
Pn
j cj2     

: (6)
The deviation prot (gross of bribe) is
1 =
Pn
j cj2     
2
: (7)
We call the bids (q1; p1) ; (q2; p2) dened in Lemma 1 and the formulas in (5) and (6) the
out-of-equilibrium competitive bids.
We now proceed to investigate the whole game by backward induction.
At step 5, the auctioneer chooses whether to reject or maintain the outcome. If the winner
is not a rm that demanded the scoring rule the auctioneer expects no bribe. Rejecting the
auction outcome earns him zero as well so it is optimal to do so. When the winner is a
rm that demanded the favor, if he rejects he earns 0 while if he maintains the outcome he
collects the bribe. So maintaining the outcome is optimal. At Step 3 rms make their o¤ers.
By lemma 1 we know that any o¤er includes the cost e¢ cient specication. Consider rst the
subgame which corresponds to single-peaked b = j for some j = 1; :::; k and say it favors
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rm 1. In equilibrium rms submit deal on all their low cost components with the same
bribe. By assumption each rm has a comparative advantage on at least one component
and we know that the auctioneer chooses to announce a scoring rule demanded by one rm
only. Firms therefore correctly infer from b = j that they are anti-symmetric in cost with
respect to j so in particular when a rm has high cost (rm 2), it infers that its opponent
has low cost. We note that these are precisely the beliefs that we assumed when deriving the
competitive equilibrium above. The only distinction is that they apply to b = j : Firm 2s
best response is to to bid p2 dened in (5) for b = j . If 2 wins, it pays no bribe. Firm 1
bids p1 as dened in (6) which secures win and precisely covers the bribe cost b =
( )
2
:
In an (out-of-equilibrium) subgame where ^ 6= j the non-deviating rm believes that the
opponent has low cost on all emphasized components, so it is optimal to submit the Nash
equilibrium o¤ers with the price bid given by (5). By construction this is optimal.
At step 2, the auctioneer chooses a deal among the submitted menus (M1;M2) with
Mi = f(il; bil)gnikl=1 : The auctioneer expects rms to ask for scoring rules that emphasize
components in which they have low cost. Since U = b   m, he selects a deal (^; bk) such
that bk 2 max fb1l; b2lgnikl=1 and bk  m. If no such deal has been submitted the auctioneer
announces the true . From among acceptable highest bribe deals (bk  m) he is indi¤erent
between those with a scoring rule demanded by one or by the two rms. So it is optimal
to choose a deal that emphasizes a component demanded by one rm only. By assumption
there are at least two such deals at equilibrium.
At step 1, we know from step 2 that the auctioneer selects a deal associated with the
highest bribe and among those deal with a scoring rule demanded by one rm only. We show
that (i) rms demand single-peaked scoring rules, (ii) they submit deals for each low cost
component, (iii) they bid the same bribe b in each deal.
i. The scoring rule only determines the prot-if-win which for arbitrary b is 1 =Pn
j cj2( )
2
; since
Pn
j cj = 1; 1 is maximized with any j1 = (0; :::; 1j ; :::; 0); 1j = 
and 2j = . Hence, rms demand a single peaked-scoring rule.
ii. The rms dont know each others cost, but they assume the other rm acts according
to the equilibrium strategy i.e., submits deals on each of its low cost component. Consider
rm 1s incentives to submit a deal with j1 and some b and 1j = : It knows that the agent
only chooses a deal with a highest bribe so the bribe must be b: But we show below that b
corresponds to the rents of a low cost rm winning over a high cost rm so if the rm was to
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win with such a deal on a high cost component it would earn a negative payo¤. Assume that
1j = : When rm 1 submits a deal, it wins if rm 2 has high cost (and thus 1 is alone to
submit on that component). If rm 1 does not submit a deal with j1; it can still win if rm
2 has low cost (and 2 is alone to submit a deal on that component) by slightly undercutting
2s o¤er in the o¢ cial auction. But rm 1 knows that in that case the auctioneer will reject
the auctions outcome because the winner will not pay the bribe which results in zero payo¤s
for the rm so free-riding does not pay. Now for any given M2(1) the probability that the
auctioneer nds a deal with a scoring rule demanded by only rm 1 only increases with the
number of submitted deals by rm 1. So it is optimal to submit a deal on each low cost
component.
iii. A rms prot-if-win with any of the j it demands is equal to (
 )
2
: The corruption
game boils down to a symmetric information common value auction. By a standard argument,
rms submit the common value b1 = b2 =
( )
2
for all component with low cost:QED
C Proof of Proposition 2
We show that full cartel e¢ ciency can be achieved in an equilibrium supported by a Trigger
strategy with a punishment phase corresponding to the play of the equilibrium of proposition
1. The cooperative phase is characterized by the following:
Firmsstrategy
At step 1 the in-turn-rm (referred to with subscript in) submits a menuMin =
 
b;j
	
with in;j = ; b = m. The out-of-turn rm (referred to with subscript out) submits
Mout =
 
0;j
	
for some out;j ; b = 0:
At step 3 for any bt the in-turn rm submits an o¤er that scores less than zero. The
out-of-turn rm bids to score strictly less than zero.
The auctioneers strategy:
At step 2 the auctioneer selects from among the submitted corrupt deals a one associated
with the highest bribe. If that bribe covers the costs, he announces the associated scoring
rule.
At step 5 the auctioneer maintains the outcome if the winner is the one who demanded
the favor (and by assumption will pay for it) otherwise he rejects the outcome.
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Let Ht 1 = H denote a public history of the game when it is in a cooperative phase i.e.,
in all t0 = 1; :::; t  1 the outcome is characterized by the rm wining in alternation i.e., every
second period.
The trigger strategy entails that in any subgame following Ht 1 6= H; the rms move to
(stay in) the punishment phase. Since it is a Nash equilibrium, conforming is by construction
a best response for all players.
We now consider a subgame following Ht 1 = H to show that cooperating according to
the strategies dened above is optimal:We proceed by backward induction.
At step 5 the short-run auctioneer has the same incentives as in the stage game, see proof
of proposition 1.
At step 3 whatever bt, the in-turn rm expects the out-of-turn rm to bid less that zero.
The maximal payo¤ c = 12 yields when the in-turn rm o¤ers the e¢ cient specication and
a price so its o¤er scores just zero. So the proposed strategy is optimal. The out-of-turn
rm may deviate. The most protable deviation occurs when the announced scoring rule is
single-peaked and the out-of-turn rm also has low cost on the emphasized component and
submits p = 1

 "; " > 0: Its gain is d = 12 ": However the in-turn rule is violated and from
the next period on the rms revert to the zero payo¤ competitive equilibrium of proposition
1. So the out-of-turn rm complies with the collusive strategy whenever
IC :
 
1  2

1
2
 m

 1
2
  " (8)
which is satised for   1; 1 2 (0; 1) with @1@m > 0:
At step 2 since the auctioneer is a short-run player, the argument developed in the proof
of proposition 1 carries over. A distinction is that the auctioneer may announce a scoring
demanded by both. This is because there is no competition in the o¢ cial auction, the out-
of-turn rm submits an o¤er that scores less than zero.
At step 1 the rms submit their menu of deals. Since the auctioneer only cares about
the bribe the argument of proposition 1 carry over and rms always propose deals with
single-peaked scoring rules. The in-turn rm expects the out-of-turn rm to o¤er b = 0: It
is su¢ cient to o¤er b = m to cover the auctioneers cost so he announces one of the in-turn
rms preferred scoring rule. The out-of-turn rm can defect and o¤er b = m+ " associated
with a menu including a most preferred scoring rule out. It knows that the auctioneer
would respond by announcing that b= out: But such a deviation brings at most a prot
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of 12  m   ". Since we know that such a win triggers a punishment phase defection is not
protable under (8) since there the gain from defection is larger. Hence for  satisfying (8)
the proposed strategies do form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. The cartels
gain is maximized. In each period, the scoring rule is the most favorable to the winner, the
price is given by the reserve score and the bribe is the lowest possible.QED
D Proof of Proposition 3
Firmsstrategy:
At step 1 submit a menu of deal o¤ers
 
j ; b
	
with a deal for each component j; ji =
; j = 1; 2; with 1 = (1; 0) and 2 = (0; 1). If the menu contains two deals, the same bribe
b (m) dened below is o¤ered in both.
At step 3 rms submit the competitive equilibrium o¤ers under the assumption that they
are anti-symmetric in cost.
The auctioneer:
At step 2 the auctioneer selects from among the submitted corrupt deals a deal that
includes the highest bribe provided the bribe covers the cost m (  b)2. From among the
highest bribe deals he selects a one associated with a scoring rule only demanded by one rm
if any. If there are several such deals he randomizes. He announces the associated scoring
rule.
At step 5 the auctioneer maintains the outcome of the auction if the winner is a rm who
demanded the favor (and by assumption will pay for it). Otherwise he rejects the outcome.
We below show that the strategies described above form a symmetric Perfect Bayes-Nash
equilibrium with favoritism. We develop the proof in terms of rm 1 which has its advantage
in the production of q1: Firm 2 is symmetric with advantage in component 2. We proceed by
backward induction.
The reasoning for step 5 is the same as in proposition 1 and 2. At Step 3, the reasoning
here is identical to the one in the proof of proposition 1 for k = 2; 1 =  and 2 = (1  ) :
A step 2 the auctioneers utility function is bi  m (i   )2 : So it is optimal to choose
a deal among the submitted ones as follows bi = argmaxf(b1;1)(b2;2)g bi   m (i   )2 s.t.
bi  m (i   )2 : In case of ties, he is indi¤erent and may just as well select a deal demanded
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by one rm only: By assumption and given the rmsequilibrium strategies, we know that
there is at least one such. The auctioneer announces bi if i  bi = bi. If no bribe deal can
secure win in the o¢ cial auction or if bbi < m  bi   2, the auctioneer announces the true
alpha.
A step 1 we start with a Lemma
Lemma 2 In a symmetric equilibrium rms always demand the cartel e¢ cient scoring
rule contingent on their cost structure i.e., 1 = 1 and correspondingly 2 = 0:
For rm 1, the "cartel e¢ cient" scoring rule is dened 1 = argmaxb1

( )
2
(2b1   1) m (b1   )2 :
It is the scoring rule that maximizes the cartels payo¤ given that there is a cost asso-
ciated with deviations from the true scoring rule. We know that the auctioneer selects
the rm whose deal maximizes U(bi; i) = bi   m (i   )2 : Suppose by contradiction
that an equilibrium o¤er is (b1; 1) with 1 6= 1: We now construct o¤er (b01; 1) with
b
0
1 = b1  m(1=2  1)2 +m(1=2  1)2: By construction
prob
 
U
 
b01; 

1

> U (b2; 2)

= prob (U (b1; 1) > U (b2; 2)) = 1=2:
Now
E
 
b01; 

1

=
" 
   
2
  b01
#
prob
 
U
 
b01; 

1

> U (b2; 2)

=
" 
   
2
  b1 +m(1=2  1)2  m(1=2  1)2
#
1
2
=
"  
   
2
(21   1)  b1
!
+
 
2
 
   
2
 m1
!
(1  1)
#
1
2
>
" 
   
2
(21   1)  b1
#
prob (U (b1; 1) > U (b2; 2))
where the inequality holds because m < (
 )
2
.
Hence 1 = 1 and similarly for rm 2: 2 = 0.
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We now consider the determination of b1 and b2: The expected prot of rm 1
E1 (b1; b2) =
  
   
2
  b1
!
prob fU (b1; 1) > U (b2; 0)g
=
  
   
2
  b1
!
prob
n
b1  m (1  )2 > b2  m ()2
o
=
  
   
2
  b1
!
prob

 >
1
2
+
(b2   b1)
2m

=
  
   
2
  b1
!
1
2
  (b2   b1)
2m

:
Taking the derivative with respect to b1 an interior solution satises
b1 =
1
2
b2 +
1
2
  
   
2
 m
!
:
In a symmetric equilibrium we obtain
b = b1 = b

2 =
 
   
2
 m; (9)
In a symmetric equilibrium the auctioneer never distorts more than by :5 so the highest cost
for distortion is 14m. Firms bid the bribe in (9) which is a best response to the other rm.
Hence, for (
 )
2
  m > 14m , m < 45
( )
2
; the investigated strategies described above
including the deal o¤ers (b; 1) and (b; 0) form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the FSA with
favoritism: QED:
E Proof of proposition 4
In this proof we consider two types of collusion, characterize the condition for their sustain-
ability and compare them in terms of cartel e¢ ciency.
In-turn rule collusion:
This type of collusion is similar to the one in Proposition 2. The strategies are the same
as the ones described in the proof of proposition 2 when putting k = 2: Any deviation from
those strategies triggers the play of the Nash equilibrium of proposition 3 from the next
period on.
As usual we investigate the game by backward induction and focus on incentives to comply
in a period following a history of compliance play.
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At step 5 the same argument as in the proof of proposition 3 applies since our agent is
short-run.
At Step 3 the designated winner, say rm 1, has no incentive to deviate while the other
rm might undercut the o¤er of rm 1 and get at most 1
2
in the current period and a
continuation payo¤of 
1 2)

( )
2
  b (m)

afterwards. Given that b (m) = ( )
2
 m; the
incentive constraint writes

1  2

1
2
 m

 1
2
+

1  2m: (10)
where the rhs is the compliance payo¤ and the lhs is the deviation payo¤. We show below
that deterring deviation at step 1 is more demanding so we postpone the derivation of the
limit on the discount factor.
At step 2 there is no incentive to deviate for the agent for reason similar to those in propo-
sition 3. At step 1 rm 2 might make a secret bribe bid of b 2 (0; 2m] and demand ^ = 0. The
agent will grant rm 2 the favor of choosing its demanded scoring rule when  2 [0; b=(2m)]:
Firm 2 then gets a payo¤ of 12   b and a continuation payo¤ 1 2

( )
2
  b (m)

. The
expected payo¤ from this deviation is
E =
b
2m

1
2
  b

+
b
2m

1  2m+

1  b
2m


1  2

1
2
 m

:
In order for b = 0 to be an equilibrium strategy, the above expression needs to be maxi-
mized at b = 0. Since the expression is strictly concave in b we get the following restriction
for the discount factor
@E
@b
(b = 0)  0 or 1
2
+

1  2

m  1
2

 0 (11)
The expression in the bracket is negative and increasing in m: By assumption we have
m < 45
( )
2
but to simplify the calculation, we check for m = (
 )
2
the constraint is more
restrictive then. Thus a conservative formulation of the constraint on the discount factor
yields    where
 :

(1  2) =


For  = 2:2;  = 0:8:
Contingent rule
We use the notation: w1(2) (Y ES) and w1(2) (NO) to denote rm 1(2) continuation after
a period when it won respectively when it lost. We focus on a smaller set of strategies
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including b 2 14m; 54m	 so in particular we only consider a defection that secures win. To
out-compete rm 1 when the true scoring rule is most favorable to 1 e.g.  = 1, rm 2 must
o¤er 54m: Restricting the set of possible deviations is not crucial to the result but it simplies
the presentation.
Let Ht 1 = H denote a history of the game where in all periods t0; t0 = 0; ::t   1; we
have bt0 2 f0; 1g and S pt0 ; qt0 = 0.
We propose the following strategies for the players:
i. If Ht 1 6= H; the rms and the auctioneer play the equilibrium strategies depicted in
proposition 3.
ii. If Ht 1 = H; the rmsstrategy is
At step 0 rm 1 (2) learn its cost structure:
At step 1 rm 1(2) submits a menu of deals one for each component where cost is low
demanding a single-peaked scoring rule and o¤ering the same bribe b = 14m:
At step 3
- If bt is single-peaked, the rm with the congruent cost structure submits an o¤er
including the corresponding e¢ cient specication such that the o¤er scores zero. Firm 2 with
the non congruent cost structure submits an o¤er that scores at most zero.
- If the announced scoring rule is not single peaked, the winner is designated by a random
rule characterized below. The designated winner submits and o¤er that scores zero and the
other rm submits an o¤er that scores slightly less than zero.
The auctioneers strategy
At step 2, the auctioneer selects the corruption deal among that maximize his utility
provided the bribe covers expected costs and he announces the corresponding scoring rule.
In case of ties he randomizes.
At step 5 if the scoring rule is single peaked but the winner is not a rm that demanded
that scoring rule he rejects the auctions result. Otherwise he maintains it.
We below show that these strategies form a Perfect Public Equilibrium of the repeated
game with the stage game as described in section 5. Collusive bidding at step 3 is sustainable
relying on an argument similar to the one developed in Proposition 2 when setting k = 2: The
non-favored (say 2) rms incentives to comply with the collusive strategy is satised for  >2
where 2 is dened by the following equality (1 )
1
2w2 (NO) =
1
2
  "+ (1 ) 12ne the lowest
compliance payo¤ is set equal to the defection payo¤.
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At step 2 the proposed strategy is optimal for the auctioneer appealing to the same
argument as in proposition 3. At step 1 the rms may consider defection and o¤er a deal
with a bribe equal to 54m: The defection payo¤ is at most 
d = c   54m while the expected
compliance payo¤ is 12

c   14m

: We rst note that for m  49c there is no incentive to
defect. But for m < 49
c (recall that we only consider the interval m < 45
( )

implying
m < 49
c): The following incentive constraint, applies in any period t preceded by t 1 = 0:
1
2

c   1
4
m

+ 

1
2
w1 (Y ES) +
1
2
w1 (NO)

>

c   5
4
m

+ w1 (Y ES)


1
2
w1 (NO)  1
2
w1 (Y ES)

>

1
2
c   9
8
m

 [w1 (NO)  w1 (Y ES) ] 

c   9
4
m

(12)
So as   ! 1; w1 (NO) w1 (Y ES)!
 
c   94m

the continuation payo¤ of rm 1 following
an announcement of b = 1 must be lower that the one following b = 0: This payo¤ is achieved
by letting rm 2 submit an o¤er in the o¢ cial auction that induces a lower prot to rm 1.
For m = 49
c (the highest m for which there is an incentive to deviate); the rhs is equal to 0:
Consider the following strategy that satises the constraint. The full punishment is taken in
the next-following period and "the clock is reset" i.e., the next following payo¤s in t+ 2 are
determined as if bt = 0. Note that when (12) holds incentives to comply in a period following
an announcement of  = 1 also are satised. This is because the gain from defection are
lower then. Hence, for  2 and w1 (1) = w2 (0) satisfying (12) the proposed strategies form
a Perfect Public Equilibrium of the repeated game.
As m ! 49c the equilibrium average expected payo¤ of the contingent scheme tends
toward 12 (
c  m=4) = 49c while the average payo¤ of the xed in-turn rule is
5
9
c
(1+) : So
for any  > 54   1; the contingent scheme yields a higher expected payo¤. We note that
the condition m  49c is consistent with the condition in proposition 4 m  45ne when
4
9
1
2  45
( )
2
which requires   49:
On the other side when m ! 0 the rhs of (12) tends to c implying t+11 (1) ! 0
corresponding to an average equilibrium expected payo¤ in the contingent scheme of 14
c
which is strictly smaller than the average payo¤ in the in-turn scheme 
c
(1+) : QED
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